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Abstract.  Th is article deals with structural funds allocation for projects realized by Czech 
regional and local authorities in the programming period 2007-2013. Geographical 
distribution of structural funds in the context of the equity and effi  ciency goals is 
mapped. Two research questions are formulated in this regard. Th e fi rst research ques-
tion concerns the position of lagging regions in structural funds allocation. Th e second 
research question maps spatial spillovers of public procurement contracts supported 
by structural funds. Th e fi ndings point at a rather disadvantaged position of lagging 
regions in structural funds allocation. Th is position is further worsened by spatial 
spillovers of public procurement contracts. Th us, spatial coherence between the EU 
and Czech regional policies is questioned.
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INTRODUCTION
Public fi nance is a considerable topic of economic research. One strand of research deals with the 
relationship between public fi nance and economic growth. In this regard, the position of public fi nance 
in economic growth theories (see, e.g., Auteri and Costantini, 2004; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992) and 
the impact of public fi nance on economic growth (see, e.g., Afonso and Furceri, 2010) are discussed. Fiscal 
decentralization adds the spatial dimension into the discussion (see, e.g., Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2011; 
Davoodi and Zou, 1998).
Th e other strand of research is positioned in the interplay between the equity and effi  ciency goals of 
public fi nance allocation. From the spatial perspective, the equity goal is connected with public fi nance allo-
cation in lagging regions, while the effi  ciency goal with public fi nance allocation in main growth regions (see, 
e.g., Morgenroth, 2010). Note an increasing political emphasis on the spatial allocation of public funding. 
Th is is especially true for the EU territory because territorial cohesion was inserted into the Lisbon Treaty 
alongside economic and social cohesion (see, e.g., Camagni, 2009; Golobic and Marot, 2011; Novosák et 
al., 2013). It is highly desirable, therefore, to map the geographical pattern of public fi nance allocation.
Despite its importance, mapping of geographical distribution of public fi nance has several limita-
tions. Firstly, Blažek and Macešková (2010), Morgenroth (2010), Cabras (2011), Heald and Short (2002) 
point out the lack of spatially disaggregated data. Secondly, Blažek and Macešková (2010), Dall´erba and Le 
Gallo (2008) speak about diff erent geographical distribution of public fi nance when considering real alloca-
tion on one hand and benefi ciaries’ location (headquarter) on the other. Th irdly, Heald and Short (2002) 
note limited knowledge about spatial spillovers of public funds. Th us, for example, geographical distribution 
of public fi nance may be changed by the allocation of public procurement contracts (see, e.g., Cabras, 2011; 
Peck and Cabras, 2011). Altogether, geographical distribution of public fi nance remains often unknown.
Th is paper is embedded in the aforementioned theoretical framework, including the three research 
limitations. Th e goal is to map geographical distribution of EU structural funds (hereafter referred to as 
SFs) in the context of the equity and effi  ciency goals. Moreover, the role of public procurement contracts is 
evaluated. Th e focus of this paper is on projects supported by SFs in the programming period 2007-2013 
(excluding the European territorial cooperation goal) and realized by regional and local authorities in the 
Czech Republic. Note that SFs were a key instrument of, and regional and local authorities were important 
stakeholders of Czech regional development strategies in this period (see, e.g., Wokoun, 2007). Th e main 
results of this paper do not indicate higher SFs allocation in lagging regions (see, e.g., Hájek et al., 2012; 
Hájek, et al., 2014 for similar conclusions). Th e position of lagging regions was, in addition, worsened by 
the allocation of public procurement contracts. 
Th e article is structured as follows. Th e next section summarizes the main fi ndings from literature 
review. In section 2, the research methodology is introduced. Th e third and the fourth sections discuss the 
main fi ndings from the research. Th e last section concludes.
1. LITERATURE REVIEW
Th e research on geographical pattern of public fi nance is closely related to fi scal transfers. Th e es-
sence of fi scal transfers is to redistribute public fi nance from relatively “rich” to relatively “poor” territorial 
units. To create and secure uniform living standards through the territory is the main goal of fi scal transfers 
in Germany, for example (see, e.g., Jüßen, 2006; Hepp and von Hagen, 2011). Th e arguments of economic 
ineffi  ciency and political instability arising from large territorial disparities are used to substantiate fi scal 
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transfers (see, e.g., Boldrin and Canova, 2001; Heidenreich and Wunder, 2008). However, real allocation 
of public fi nance may be diff erent from the “rich-poor” gradient. At least two explanations may be given:
 – Firstly, Hepp and von Hagen (2011), Schraff  (2014), Dellmuth and Stoff el (2012) point out asym-
metries of negotiating power of particular territorial units due to, among others, their level of economic 
development and number of inhabitants. Lagging regions are often disadvantaged in this regard (see, 
e.g., Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2011). 
 – Secondly, Jaliu and Radulescu (2013), Kaufmann and Wagner (2005), Cappelen et al., (2003), Novosák 
et al., (2015), Wildowicz-Giegiel & Wyszkowski (2015) mention asymmetries in absorption capacity of 
particular territorial units. Lagging regions are often disadvantaged in this regard because of their low 
capability to prepare and submit good projects. Th is could be notably related to some themes, such as 
business environment (see, e.g., Belás et al., 2014; Belás et al., 2015) and innovations (see, e.g., Hájek, 
Grebeníček and Novosák, 2011; Kaufmann and Wagner, 2005).
Th e aforementioned considerations are highly relevant also for SFs and their contribution to the eq-
uity and effi  ciency goals. In this respect, a number of studies dealt with the geographical distribution of 
SFs. Lolos (2009), Dall’erba and Le Gallo (2008), Esposti and Bussoletti (2008), Beugelsdijk and Eijffi  nger 
(2005) evaluated the impact of SFs allocation on regional convergence. Novosák et al., (2015), Crescenzi 
(2009), Crescenzi, De Fillipis and Pierangeli (2015), Schraff  (2014), Lambrinidis, Psycharis and Rovolis 
(2005), Dellmuth and Stoff el (2012), Hájek et al., (2012), Smékalová et al., (2015) searched for spatial 
determinants of SFs allocation. Th e fi ndings of these studies are rather ambivalent with respect to the equity 
and effi  ciency goals, depending on the spatial level and time (ex-ante, ex-post) of evaluation. Ex-ante evalu-
ation at the NUTS 2 level points at higher SFs allocation in lagging regions; however, as expected because 
of the eligibility criteria for inclusion of regions into the convergence objective. Ex-post evaluation at lower 
spatial levels provides less obvious results. Lolos (2009) speaks about higher SFs allocation in lagging re-
gions in Greece while Morgenroth (2010) claims the opposite for Irish regions. Nevertheless, this research 
is still scarce because of the lack of spatially disaggregated data (see, e.g., Heald and Short, 2002; Blažek and 
Macešková, 2010; Morgenroth, 2010; Cabras, 2011). 
Mapping of the geographical distribution of SFs has two additional limitations. Firstly, Hájek et al., 
(2012) showed a diff erent geographical distribution of SFs for two types of evaluation: (1) real SFs allocation 
and (2) SFs allocation based on benefi ciaries’ location (see, e.g., Dall´erba and Le Gallo, 2008; Dupont and 
Martin, 2006 for this problem). Secondly, Heald and Short (2002) note that real SFs allocation is infl uenced 
by public procurement contracts. Th us, SFs allocation in one territorial unit may be squeezed out elsewhere 
in this way (see, e.g., Cabras, 2011; Peck and Cabras, 2011). Cabras (2011), Peck and Cabras (2011) claim 
that lagging regions are disadvantaged especially in competitive tendering for specialized goods and services 
due to their low absorption capacity in these thematic areas.
Th is paper integrates the research design as follows. Firstly, geographical distribution of SFs is mapped, 
considering projects realized by regional and local authorities. Th e importance of regional and local authori-
ties for both, regional and local development and public procuring is respected in this approach. Th e equity 
and effi  ciency goals are analyzed for the both types of evaluation: (1) real SFs allocation and (2) SFs alloca-
tion based on benefi ciaries’ location. Secondly, geographical distribution of public procurement contracts, 
contracted by regional and local authorities and supported by SFs is mapped. Spatial spillovers from and to 
lagging regions are quantifi ed in this way. 
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2. METHODOLOGY
To solve the problem of the lack of spatially disaggregated data, the methodology of this paper was 
based on particular projects and public procurement contracts. Two databases were, therefore, compiled. 
Th e fi rst database contained projects realized by regional and local authorities and supported by SFs in 
the programming period 2007-2013 (excluding the European territorial cooperation goal). Th e Regional 
Information Service of the Center for Regional Development of the Czech Republic (hereafter referred to as 
RIS CRD) was the source of data. Th e state in January 2013 was evaluated. Th e second database contained 
public procurement contracts contracted by regional and local authorities and supported by SFs which 
were listed in the Czech offi  cial Information System of Public Contracts (hereafter referred to as IS PC) in 
January 2013. Furthermore, several attributes of projects and public procurement contracts were added into 
the databases (see table 1). Th ese included also two spatial attributes for defi ning lagging regions (see table 
1 for their description):
 – Firstly, the defi nition of the so called regions with concentrated state support (hereafter referred to as 
RCSS) was used. Lagging regions were, therefore, understood in accord with Czech regional policy.
 – Secondly, the importance of regional hierarchy was emphasized for defi ning lagging regions. Th ese are 
understood as peripheral areas of the Czech Republic.
Table 1
Attributes of projects and public procurement contracts
Attributes Description and information source Values
Regional 
policy
- Projects categorized according to the place of their 
realization or beneﬁ ciaries’ location
- Public procurement contracts categorized according to 
beneﬁ ciaries’ location
- The list of lagging regions deﬁ ned using the ofﬁ cial 
Government resolutions at the level of the admin-
istrative districts of municipalities with extended 
competence
- RIS CRD for projects; IS PC for public procurement 
contracts
1. Lagging regions
- Structurally affected regions
- Economically weak regions
- Regions with high unemployment
2. Non-lagging regions
3. Prague
Regional 
hierarchy
- Projects categorized according to the place of their 
realization or beneﬁ ciaries’ location
- Public procurement contracts categorized according to 
beneﬁ ciaries’ location
- The levels of regional hierarchy deﬁ ned as quartiles 
of population density at the level of the administrative 
districts of municipalities with extended competence
- RIS CRD for projects; IS PC for public procurement 
contracts 
1. The highest level of regional hierarchy
2. High level of regional hierarchy
3. Low level of regional hierarchy
4. The lowest level of regional hierarchy
5. Prague
SFs 
allocation
- SFs allocation per project/public procurement contract 
and place of realization/ beneﬁ ciary’s location
- RIS CRD for projects; IS PC for public procurement 
contracts
SFs allocation in CZK
Note: In a number of cases, more places of project realization were given in the RIS CRD. However, the information about SFs alloca-
tion was at the project level only. Th erefore, SFs allocation was distributed between the places as follows. If the benefi ciary’s location 
was diff erent from all the places of project realization SFs allocation was distributed evenly between these places. If the benefi ciary’s 
location was the same as any place of project realization four times higher SFs allocation was assigned to this place.
Source: own compilation.
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Th e compiled databases were evaluated in two steps. Firstly, geographical distribution of SFs was visual-
ized on maps at the level of the administrative districts of municipalities with extended competence. Note 
that SFs allocation was normalized per one inhabitant to control for diff erent population size of particular 
territorial units. Th e fi rst insight into the position of lagging regions was provided in this way. Subsequently, 
standard methods of descriptive and inferential statistics were used. Notably, SFs allocation per one inhabit-
ant was calculated for the categories of the two spatial attributes – regional policy and regional hierarchy. Th e 
aggregate SFs allocation refers to the SFs allocation per one inhabitant of the whole category. Th e average 
SFs allocation refers to the mean value of the administrative districts of municipalities with extended com-
petence belonging to the same category. In addition, the parametric t-test for two independent samples and 
one-way ANOVA for more than two independent samples were used to test the hypothesis that the means of 
the categories, excluding Prague, of the two spatial attributes are not signifi cantly diff erent. Th e traditional 
assumptions of the two-sample independent t-test and one-way ANOVA – approximately normally distrib-
uted dependent variable for each category and homogeneity of variances – were checked by Kolmogorov-
Smirnoff  and Levene’s tests respectively. Th e results did not indicate a violation of these assumptions.
Geographical distribution of public procurement contracts supported by SFs was evaluated in the sec-
ond step of the methodology. In this respect, a new variable – spatial closeness of public procurement 
contracts – was defi ned as the share of public procurement contracts that were contracted to a contractor 
from the same territorial unit (contractor’s headquarter) as the procurer (regional and local authorities). 
Subsequently, spatial closeness of public procurement contracts was evaluated using the same methodo-
logical approach as in the fi rst step of the evaluation - cartographic visualisation and standard methods of 
descriptive (aggregate and average values of spatial closeness of public procurement contracts) and inferential 
(two-sample independent t-test and one-way ANOVA) statistics. Once again, the traditional assumptions of 
the two-sample independent t-test and one-way ANOVA were verifi ed.
3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS  GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF SFS
Th e evaluation of SFs allocation was based on 15,634 projects realized by regional and local authori-
ties. Th e total SFs allocation for these projects was CZK 152.2 billion. Figure 1 provides the fi rst insight into 
the position of lagging regions:
Th e factor of regional policy does not indicate higher SFs allocation in lagging regions for the both types 
of evaluation: (1) real SFs allocation and (2) SFs allocation based on benefi ciaries’ location. Th us, lagging 
regions are categorized in diff erent classes of SFs allocation. In other words, some lagging regions received 
very high SFs allocation while other lagging regions very low SFs allocation.
Th e factor of regional hierarchy seems to be relevant for explaining the SFs allocation on the basis of 
benefi ciaries’ location. Th us, administrative districts of large and densely populated Czech cities received 
a relatively higher SFs allocation. Note that a number of regional and local authorities have their head-
quarters just in these cities. Th e importance of regional hierarchy decreases in the evaluation of the real SFs 
allocation.
Th e relatively weak position of the capital city of Prague in the both types of evaluation is noteworthy. 
Hájek et al., (2012) provided a diff erent conclusion when evaluating SFs allocation for all types of recipi-
ents. Consequently, regional and local authorities are crucial to weaken the position of the capital city of 
Prague in SFs allocation.
Journal of International Studies Vol. 9, No.1, 2016
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Note: Th e break classes of the colour-scale calculated at the points of arithmetic mean less standard deviation, arithmetic mean, and 
arithmetic mean plus standard deviation 
Figure 1. Geographical distribution of SFs – SFs allocation per one inhabitant, administrative districts 
of municipalities with extended competence; real SFs allocation – the map above, SFs allocation based 
on beneﬁ ciaries’ location (headquarters) – the map below
Source: own compilation based on the data from the RIS CRD and Czech Statistical Offi  ce.
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Tables 2 and 3 confi rm and extend the relevance of these fi ndings. Firstly, aggregate SFs allocation per 
one inhabitant is slightly lower in lagging regions understood as RCSS for the both types of evaluation. 
Secondly, real SFs allocation indicates even geographical distribution of SFs for the categories of the both 
variables – regional policy and regional hierarchy. Th irdly, the evaluation based on benefi ciaries’ location 
indicates low SFs allocation in economically weak regions and high SFs allocation in densely populated re-
gions. Overall, the results do not support the assumption of higher SFs allocation in lagging regions because 
of (1) low coherence between the spatial focus of EU Cohesion Policy and Czech regional policy (see, e.g., 
Hájek et al., 2014); (2) low absorption capacity of lagging regions (see, e.g., Jaliu and Radulescu, 2013); 
and (3) higher concentration of regional and municipal authorities in densely populated regions. Th us, the 
strategy of “pouring sugar over cake” seems to be relevant for the evaluation. However, such a strategy does 
not prefer SFs allocation in lagging regions to SFs allocation in non-lagging regions.
Table 2
Geographical distribution of SFs – regional policy
Regional policy - categories
SFs allocation per one inhabitant (CZK)
Real allocation Beneﬁ ciaries’ location
Aggregate Average Aggregate Average
Lagging regions 15,198 15,987 13,858 12,316
- Structurally affected regions 14,816 14,560 14,873 11,190
- Economically weak regions 14,939 15,625 9,965 9,829
- Regions with high unemployment 16,464 16,041 18,366 13,888
Non-lagging regions 16,345 15,382 16,326 11,320
Prague 4,119 4,119 7,746 7.746
Source: own compilation based on the data from the RIS CRD and Czech Statistical Offi  ce
Table 3
Geographical distribution of SFs – regional hierarchy
Regional hierarchy - categories
SFs allocation per one inhabitant (CZK)
Real allocation Beneﬁ ciaries’ location
Aggregate Average Aggregate Average
The highest level 15,600 14,168 19,468 14,058
High level 16,066 15,170 13,963 11,941
Low level 16,414 17,035 11,541 11,119
The lowest level 16,119 16,732 10,657 10,809
Prague 4,119 4,119 7,746 7,746
Source: own compilation based on the data from the RIS CRD and Czech Statistical Offi  ce.
Th e aforementioned fi ndings indicate balanced SFs allocation between lagging and non-lagging re-
gions. Question remains whether the diff erences in the mean values of SFs allocation for the defi ned cat-
egories of regional policy and regional hierarchy, excluding the capital city of Prague, are statistically sig-
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nifi cant. Th is question was tested using suitable tests for continuous dependent variable. After checking 
for their traditional assumptions (approximately normally distributed dependent variable for each category 
and homogeneity of variances), the parametric t-test for two independent samples and one-way ANOVA 
were applied. Table 4 reports the results as signifi cance values (p-values) indicating that the diff erences in 
the mean values of SFs allocation are not statistically signifi cant for either of the variables, regional policy 
and regional hierarchy. Th us, also statistical tests do not support the assumption of higher SFs allocation 
in lagging regions. Th ese results have also several implications. Firstly, the impact of SFs allocation on the 
equity goal of Czech regional policy is unclear. Secondly, territorially based instruments may increase the 
coherence between SFs allocation and Czech regional policy. Th irdly, territorial impact assessment (TIA) is 
highly desirable in order to recognize the spatial impact of SFs allocation.
Table 4
Signifi cance values (p-values) – tests of the hypotheses that the means of SFs allocation for the defi ned 
categories are not signifi cantly diff erent (regional policy, regional hierarchy)
Attributes
Signiﬁ cance value
Real allocation Beneﬁ ciaries’ location
Regional policy – two categories 0.596 0.387
Regional policy – four categories 0.875 0.289
Regional hierarchy 0.198 0.144
Note: Th e parametric t-test for two independent samples and Levene’s test for equality of variances for the fi rst case; the one-way 
ANOVA and Levene’s test for equality of variances for the remaining two cases
Note: Excluding the category “Prague” 
Source: own compilation based on the data from the RIS CRD and Czech Statistical Offi  ce.
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS  SPATIAL CLOSENESS OF PUBLIC PROCUREMENT 
CONTRACTS
Th e main results from the preceding section indicate no evidence of higher SFs allocation for projects 
realized by regional and local authorities in lagging regions. Moreover, geographical distribution of SFs al-
location for these projects may be further modifi ed by public procurement contracts. Th is section addresses 
this issue by analyzing 10,602 public procurement contracts which were contracted by regional and local 
authorities and supported by SFs. Th e spatial closeness of public procurement contracts is evaluated.
Th e fi rst step of the evaluation maps spatial closeness of public procurement contracts at the level of 
the administrative districts of municipalities with extended competence (see fi gure 2). In this regard, the 
factor of regional policy does not appear to be of high relevance for explaining diff erentiation of the spatial 
closeness variable because both, lagging and non-lagging regions are categorized in diff erent classes of the 
variable. Furthermore, high values of the spatial closeness variable for several territorial units at the highest 
level of regional hierarchy may be observed. However, several territorial units at the lowest level of regional 
hierarchy indicate high values of the spatial closeness variables as well. Altogether, the geographical pattern 
of the spatial closeness variable is rather blurred. Tables 5 and 6 extend the fi ndings by providing the main 
results from the applied methods of descriptive and inferential statistics:
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Note: Th e break classes of the colour-scale calculated at the points of arithmetic mean less standard deviation, arithmetic mean, and 
arithmetic mean plus standard deviation
Figure 2. Spatial closeness of public procurement contracts (%) – administrative districts of municipalities 
with extended competence (N=10,602)
Source: own compilation based on the data from the IS PC.
Spatial closeness of public procurement contracts is higher in non-lagging regions compared with lag-
ging regions. SFs allocation through public procurement contracts is, therefore, more frequently squeezed 
out from lagging than from non-lagging regions. However, the average values of the spatial closeness variable 
indicate more complex picture (compare with fi gure 2).
Spatial closeness of public procurement contracts is relatively high in regions at the highest level of 
regional hierarchy. Moreover, this gradient is observed also for average spatial closeness. However, the diff er-
ences are rather modest and statistically not signifi cant (see table 6).
Table 5
Spatial closeness – regional policy and regional hierarchy
Categories
Regional policy
Spatial closeness Categories
Regional hierarchy
Spatial closeness
Aggregate Average Aggregate Average
Lagging regions 53.1 % 17.5 % The highest level 55.7 % 18.6 %
- Structurally affected regions 47.1 % 14.8 % High level 29.5 % 16.8 %
- Economically weak regions 37.0 % 19.6 % Low level 27.8 % 15.3 %
- Regions with high unemployment 36.0 % 17.4 % The lowest level 28.7 % 14.4 %
Non-lagging regions 64.9 % 15.7 % Prague 42.8 % 42.8 %
Source: own compilation based on the data from the IS PC.
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Table 6
Signifi cance values (p-values) – tests of the hypotheses that the means of the spatial closeness variables 
for the defi ned categories of territorial units are not signifi cantly diff erent 
(regional policy, regional hierarchy)
Attributes Regional policy two categories
Regional policy 
four categories Regional hierarchy
Signiﬁ cance value 0.376 0.516 0.437
Note: Th e parametric t-test for two independent samples and Levene’s test for equality of variances for the fi rst case; the one-way 
ANOVA and Levene’s test for equality of variances for the remaining two cases 
Source: own compilation based on the data from the IS PC.
Spatial fl ows of public procurement contracts between the particular categories of the two spatial at-
tributes – regional policy and regional hierarchy – are shown in tables 7 and 8. Th e weak position of lag-
ging regions and regions at the lowest level of regional hierarchy is noteworthy. Th us, high shares of public 
procurement contracts are squeezed out from these two types of regions and, simultaneously, low shares of 
public procurement contracts fl ow into these two types of regions. Note even weaker position of lagging 
regions and regions at the lowest level of regional hierarchy for the fi nancial evaluation. Altogether, the weak 
position of lagging regions is caused by their low capability to absorb some types of public procurement 
contracts and by their disadvantaged position in competition with other applicants from core regions.
Table 7
Spatial fl ows of public procurement contracts from and to the defi ned categories of territorial 
units – regional policy
From/to
Regional Policy
Share in the number 
of public procurement contracts
Share in ﬁ nancial allocation 
for public procurement contracts
Lagging 
regions
Non-lagging 
regions Prague
Lagging 
regions
Non-lagging 
regions Prague
Lagging regions 53.1 % 26.5 % 20.5 % 46.5 % 23.0 % 30.5 %
Non-lagging regions 9.9 % 64.9 % 25.2 % 6.0 % 62.2 % 31.8 %
Prague 2.6 % 54.7 % 42.8 % 1.4 % 26.5 % 72.2 %
Source: own compilation based on the data from the IS PC.
Table 8
Spatial fl ows of public procurement contracts from and to the defi ned categories of territorial units – 
regional hierarchy
From/to
Regional 
hierarchy
Share in the number 
of public procurement contracts
Share in ﬁ nancial allocation 
for public procurement contracts
I II III IV V I II III IV V
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
I 55.7 % 8.2 % 6.2 % 5.1 % 24.7 % 51.7 % 4.7 % 10.1 % 2.0 % 31.5 %
II 32.8 % 29.5 % 10.0 % 3.8 % 23.9 % 32.3 % 25.0 % 6.6 % 1.8 % 34.3 %
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
III 27.9 % 14.1 % 27.8 % 7.8 % 22.4 % 29.7 % 10.5 % 23.8 % 5.1 % 30.8 %
IV 30.0 % 10.1 % 11.4 % 28.7 % 19.8 % 26.5 % 10.3 % 12.9 % 25.9 % 24.3 %
V 28.8 % 20.3 % 6.5 % 1.6 % 42.8 % 17.5 % 7.0 % 1.8 % 1.6 % 72.2 %
Note: I – the highest level of regional hierarchy, II – high level of regional hierarchy, III – low level of regional hierarchy, IV – the low-
est level of regional hierarchy, V - Prague
Source: own compilation based on the data from the IS PC.
Th e main fi ndings from the both empirical sections do not support the assumption of higher SFs alloca-
tion in lagging regions. Th us, lagging regions did not receive a higher SFs allocation for projects realized by 
regional and local authorities. Moreover, lagging regions are more prone to lose higher share of SFs alloca-
tion through public procurement contracts. Consequently, these fi ndings ought to be considered in thinking 
about the relationship between SFs allocation and Czech regional policy.
5. CONCLUSIONS
Th is paper dealt with the SFs allocation for projects realized by Czech regional and local authorities in the 
programming period 2007-2013. Geographical distribution of SFs in the context of the equity and effi  ciency 
goals was mapped. A special attention was paid to the position of lagging regions. Th e research consisted of 
two parts. Firstly, geographical distribution of SFs was evaluated. Secondly, spatial spillovers of SFs allocation 
through public procurement contracts were analyzed. In this way, this paper provides extended knowledge 
about SFs allocation than other studies (see, e.g., Lolos, 2009; Blažek and Macešková, 2010; Crescenzi, 2009).
Th e main assumption of this paper was that lagging regions received higher SFs allocation due to the goals 
of Czech regional policy. However, the main fi ndings of this paper did not support this assumption. Small and 
statistically insignifi cant diff erences were observed between lagging and non-lagging regions. In addition, lag-
ging regions were further disadvantaged by the spatial allocation of public procurement contracts. Th us, high 
share of these contracts was squeezed out from lagging regions. Infl ow of public procurement contracts did not 
compensate for the outfl ow. Generally, low coherence between the spatial focus of EU Cohesion Policy and 
Czech regional policy (see, e.g., Hájek et al.,, 2014; Hudson, 2007) and low absorption capacity of lagging 
regions (see, e.g., Jaliu and Radulescu, 2013) may be regarded as important determinants of the results.
Several political implications may be formulated from the study. Firstly, more nuanced use of territori-
ally based instruments may increase the coherence between SFs allocation and the equity goal of Czech re-
gional policy. Secondly, the methodology of this paper may be of relevance for Territorial Impact Assessment 
(TIA) methodologies (see, e.g., Camagni, 2009; Blažek and Macešková, 2010). Th irdly, the thinking about 
the spatial impact of SFs allocation ought to consider various methodological issues (e.g., type of evaluation, 
spatial spillovers from public procurement contracts and others). Finally, limitations of the research should 
be considered as well. Th ese include: (1) the focus of the paper on regional and local authorities only; (2) 
missing thematic decomposition of SFs allocation; (3) limited research on determinants of SFs allocation; 
(4) missing discussion of the most suitable spatial level for evaluation. Th ese limitations may be regarded 
also as the future directions of research.
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